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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW: WAIVER OF THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK
PRODUCT PROTECTION
Ralph Ruebner* and Katarina Durcova**

I. INTRODUCTION
Effective January 1, 2013, two new Illinois Supreme Court rules
clarify and limit the waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work
product protection rule. Illinois Rule of Evidence 5021 (“IRE 502”), which
*

Professor of Law and the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at The John Marshall Law School.
He serves as the Reporter to the Supreme Court Committee on Illinois Evidence. This article
presents the author’s personal views and does not reflect the views of the Supreme Court
Committee on Illinois Evidence.
**
Staff Attorney, Criminal Division, Circuit Court of Cook County. This article presents the
author’s personal views and does not reflect the views of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
1.
Ill. R. Evid. 502:
(a) Disclosure Made in an Illinois Proceeding or to an Illinois Office or Agency; Scope of
a Waiver. When the disclosure is made in an Illinois proceeding or to an Illinois office
or agency and waives the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, the
waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or information in any proceeding
only if:
(1) the waiver is intentional;
(2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same
subject matter; and
(3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.
(b) Inadvertent Disclosure. When made in an Illinois proceeding or to an Illinois office or
agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in any proceeding if:
(1) the disclosure is inadvertent;
(2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure;
and
(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if
applicable) following Supreme Court Rule 201(p).
(c) Disclosure Made in a Federal or Another State’s Proceeding or to a Federal or Another
State’s Office or Agency. When the disclosure is made in a federal or another state’s
proceeding or to a federal or another state’s office or agency and is not the subject of a
court order concerning waiver, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in an
Illinois proceeding if the disclosure:
(1) would not be a waiver under this rule if it had been made in an Illinois proceeding;
or
(2) is not a waiver under the law governing the federal or state proceeding where the
disclosure occurred.
(d) Controlling Effect of a Court Order. An Illinois court may order that the privilege or
protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the
court—in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other proceeding.
(e) Controlling Effect of a Party Agreement. An agreement on the effect of disclosure in
an Illinois proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is
incorporated into a court order.
(f) Definitions. In this rule:
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spells out the limitations on waiver, is accompanied by a “clawback
provision” in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(p) (“Rule 201(p)”)2 that
details the procedural steps a disclosing party should take to successfully
assert the privilege following an inadvertent discovery disclosure.
Additionally, these changes clarify the mandatory duty of the receiving
party. IRE 502 was modeled on Federal Rule of Evidence 502 (“FRE 502”)
and Rule 201(p) was modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(5)(B). Both rules represent a clarification of, and in certain instances,
a departure from Illinois common law. This survey article will provide a
detailed summary of these recent changes in Illinois.
II. ILLINOIS ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK
PRODUCT PROTECTION
Although IRE 502 has codified the waiver of the attorney-client
privilege and work product protection, the privilege and protection rules
remain governed by the common law in Illinois.3 Illinois’ attorney-client
privilege and work product protection are generally governed by “the
principles of the common law,” absent a contrary statute, Supreme Court
rule, or a constitutional provision.4 The attorney-client privilege protects
communications between a client and a professional legal advisor when the

(1)

2.

3.

4.

“attorney-client privilege” means the protection that applicable law provides for
confidential attorney-client communications; and
(2) “work-product protection” means the protection that applicable law provides for
tangible material (or its intangible equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(p):
If information inadvertently produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or
of work-product protection, the party making the claim may notify any party that
received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, each
receiving party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information
and any copies; must not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved;
must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if the receiving party disclosed
the information to third parties before being notified; and may promptly present the
information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. The producing
party must also preserve the information until the claim is resolved.
This is similar to FRE 502, which “makes no attempt to alter federal or state law on whether a
communication or information is protected under the attorney-client privilege or work product
immunity as an initial matter.” FED. R. EVID. 502, Advisory Committee Notes.
Illinois common law attorney-client privilege protects “communications which the claimant either
expressly made confidential or which he could reasonably believe under the circumstances would
be understood by the attorney as such” Garvy v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 2012 IL App (1st) 110115,
¶ 30. During discovery, the burden is initially on the party asserting the attorney-client privilege,
and not on the party seeking discovery of the allegedly protected items. Janousek v. Slotky, 2012
IL App (1st) 113432, ¶ 23.
ILL. R. EVID. 501.
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client seeks legal advice.5 In addition, it protects the confidentiality of
communications between a party or the party’s agents and the attorney.6
Although courts in Illinois have considered the two doctrines to be
“separate and distinct,” IRE 502 has set out the same waiver rule for work
product and for material protected by the attorney-client privilege.7
Pursuant to IRE 502(f)(2), work product protection applies to “tangible
material (or its intangible equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial”8 by or for a party to the subsequent litigation.9 Until the
adoption of IRE 502(f)(2), which is modeled on FRE 502(g)(2),10 the
Illinois work product doctrine was viewed more narrowly than the federal
work product doctrine.11
In Illinois, “only ‘opinion work product,’ matter which discloses the
theories, mental impressions or litigation plans of a party’s attorney, is
protected from discovery.”12 In contrast, under the broader federal
standard, “all work performed by an attorney or his [or her] agent in
anticipation of litigation is protected from discovery.”13 Under FRCP
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.

13.

Ralph Ruebner & Katarina Durcova, Illinois Evidence: Illinois Rules of Evidence, Statutes, and
Constitution; A Compendium for Criminal Litigation 112 (Vandeplas Publishing, LLC, 2012).
Janousek v. Slotky, 2012 IL App (1st) 113432, ¶ 31, citing People v. Knuckles, 165 Ill. 2d 125,
131 (1995).
Id. at ¶ 34; see also ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(b)(2) (“Privilege and Work Product. All matters that are
privileged against disclosure on the trial, including privileged communications between a party or
his agent and the attorney for the party, are privileged against disclosure through any discovery
procedure. Material prepared by or for a party in preparation for trial is subject to discovery only
if it does not contain or disclose the theories, mental impressions, or litigation plans of the party's
attorney. The court may apportion the cost involved in originally securing the discoverable
material, including when appropriate a reasonable attorney's fee, in such manner as is just.”).
ILL. R. EVID. 502(f).
Fischel & Kahn, Ltd. v. van Straaten Gallery, Inc., 189 Ill. 2d 579, 591, 727 N.E. 2d 240, 246
(2000).
FED. R. EVID 502(g)(2): “work-product protection” means the protection that applicable law
provides for tangible material (or its intangible equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation or
for trial; see also FED. R. EVID 502(g) commentary: “The rule's coverage is limited to attorneyclient privilege and work product. The operation of waiver by disclosure, as applied to other
evidentiary privileges, remains a question of federal common law. Nor does the rule purport to
apply to the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.”
The definition of work product “materials” is intended to include both tangible and intangible
information. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003) (“work
product protection extends to both tangible and intangible work product”).”
Mlynarski v. Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 213 Ill. App. 3d 427, 432, 572 N.E.2d 1025,
1029 (1991).
Id.; See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(b)(2) (“Material prepared by or for a party in preparation for trial is
subject to discovery only if it does not contain or disclose the theories, mental impressions, or
litigation plans of the party’s attorney.”); See e.g., Shields v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
353 Ill. App. 3d 506, 510-11, 818 N.E. 2d 851, 854-55 (2004).
Mlynarski, at 432; FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26(b)(3)(A) & (B):
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials.
(A) Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and
tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
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26(b)(3), fact work product, which includes documents and tangible
materials prepared in anticipation of litigation,14 is discoverable if the party
seeking discovery “has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case
and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by
other means.”15 On the other hand, opinion work product, which includes
the mental impressions, theories, and opinions of the attorney,16 is “nearly
absolutely immune” from discovery under FRCP 26(b)(3).17 Illinois,
however, has not adopted FRCP 26(b)(3).
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(2) and IRE 502(f)(2) appear to be
in conflict, because IRE 502(f)(2) adopted the broader federal definition of
work product protection that had previously been explicitly rejected by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Monier v. Chamberlain.18 In Monier, the Illinois
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of work product protection, finding it
“preferable to the Federal position”19 for two reasons. First, the Illinois
Supreme Court found the narrower definition of work product protection
superior to the federal definition, because it was clear-cut and would
“render[] material encompassed thereby absolutely exempt from discovery,

14.
15.
16.
17.

18.

19.

party or its representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent). But, subject to Rule 26(b)(4), those materials may be
discovered if:
(i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and
(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and
cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.
(B) Protection Against Disclosure. If the court orders discovery of those materials, it must
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of a party's attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.
Appleton Papers, Inc. v. E.P.A., 702 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir. 2012); Charles W. Ehrhardt &
Matthew D. Schultz, Pulling Skeletons From The Closet: A Look Into The Work-Product Doctrine
As Applied To Expert Witnesses, 31 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 67, 70 (Fall 2003).
Nutramax Lab., Inc. v. Twin Lab., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 462 (D. Md. 1998).
Appleton Papers, Inc. v. EPA, 702 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir. 2012); Charles W. Ehrhardt &
Matthew D. Schultz, Pulling Skeletons From The Closet: A Look Into The Work-Product Doctrine
As Applied To Expert Witnesses, 31 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 67, 70 (Fall 2003).
Nutramax Lab., Inc. v. Twin Lab., Inc,, 183 F.R.D. 458, 462 (D. Md. 1998), citing In re Allen,
106 F.3d 582, 607 (4th Cir. 1997) (opinion work product enjoys “nearly absolute” immunity); In
Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 1994) (opinion work product even “more
scrupulously protected” than fact work product); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet
Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992) (opinion work product “absolutely immune” from
discovery); Martin Marietta v. United States, 856 F.2d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1988); In re John Doe,
662 F.2d 1073, 1080 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1000, 102 S.Ct. 1632, 71 L.Ed.2d 867
(1982) (opinion work product enjoys “nearly absolute” immunity from discovery); Duplan Corp
v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1217 (4th Cir. 1976) (opinion work product “immune”
from discovery).
Shields v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 353 Ill. App. 3d 506, 511, 818 N.E.2d 851, 855
(2004), citing Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 360, 221 N.E. 2d 40 (1966), and noting,
“Our supreme court [in Monier] expressly rejected the federal definition of ‘work product’ and
deliberately narrowed the scope of the protection the work product doctrine provides.”).
Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 361 (1966).
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while at the same time freeing relevant and material evidentiary matter.”20
Second, the Illinois Supreme Court opted away from the federal definition
because there was a “huge jungle of conflicting decisions” in federal courts
attempting to interpret and to apply the definition.21 The conflict arose
because FRCP 26(b)(3) only “partially codified”22 the work product
doctrine first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Hickman v.
Taylor.23 Illinois has not adopted FRCP 26(b)(3), and the Illinois Supreme
Court has rejected the Hickman standard.24 Illinois has only adopted the
broader federal definition of work product protection under FRE 502(g)(2).
In Hickman, the U.S. Supreme Court sought to protect files and
mental impressions of an attorney, including “written statements, private
memoranda and personal recollections prepared or formed [ . . . ] in the
course of his legal duties.”25 The Supreme Court also included in that
definition “interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs,
mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and
intangible ways.”26 FRCP 26(b)(3), on the other hand, states that “a party
may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its
representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent).” FRCP 26(b)(3) specifically “protect[s]
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the
litigation.” FRCP 26(b)(3) has been found to “more clearly protect[] nonattorney work product than Hickman.”27 FRCP 26(b)(3), however, does not

20.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
The Hickman [v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)] case, in holding that the plaintiff could not
discover statements taken by the defense of occurrence witnesses because they
constituted the “work product” of an attorney, intimated that circumstances indicating
“good cause” might, in a proper case, require the production of material ordinarily
encompassed within the concept of “work product.” Its progeny in the lower Federal
courts amounts to a huge jungle of conflicting decisions. (See Anno. 73 A.L.R. 2d 12;
Kennelly, The Work Product Doctrine in Illinois, (1963) Negligence Law Forum 129,
134-40.) We believe that narrowing the scope of the “work product” doctrine—and
rendering material encompassed thereby absolutely exempt from discovery, while at the
same time freeing relevant and material evidentiary matter— is preferable to the Federal
position.
Id.
Id.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130, 141 (D. Mass. 2004).
Hickman v. Taylor 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
Monier, v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 361 (1966).
Hickman, at 510 (1947).
Id. at 511.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, at 141. (“unlike Hickman, Rule 26(b)(3) does not reach ‘intangible’
work product, but Rule 26(b)(3) more clearly protects non-attorney work product than Hickman
does”).
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cover intangible work product.28 FRE 502(g)(2), which is the basis for IRE
502(f)(2), provides a definition for work product, which includes tangible
and intangible work product.
It appears that to this day the federal courts have not settled on a clear
definition of the phrase “prepared in anticipation of litigation” within the
meaning of FRCP 26(b)(3).29 Instead, federal district courts follow three
different standards: (1) “because of” the anticipated litigation;30 (2) “for
use” in litigation;31 and (3) the “primary motivating purpose” standard.32
The majority of federal courts apply the “because of” standard.33 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has also adopted this
test.34 Under this standard, work product protection “applies to attorney-led
investigations when the documents at issue ‘can fairly be said to have been
prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation,’ . . . because
‘some articulable claim, likely to lead to litigation, [has] arisen.’” 35 The
courts using the “for use” in litigation standard have explained that it
applies work product protection only to “work done in anticipation of or for
trial.”36 This standard, however, does not apply to materials prepared “in
28.
29.
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.

Id., citing Jeff A. Anderson et al., Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 760, 762, 865 (August 1983).
United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998); Robert S. Clark, 11 UTAH BAR J. 9
(1998).
See, e.g., Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 622 (7th Cir. 2010); In re Prof'ls
Direct Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 432, 439 (6th Cir. 2009); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d 900, 907
(9th Cir. 2004); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson LLP, 305 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 2002);
Maine v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002); Montgomery County v.
MicroVote Corp., 175 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194,
1195 (2d Cir. 1998); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th
Cir. 1992).
United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. R.I. 2009).
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982).
Grace M. Giesel, Article: Alternative Litigation Finance and the Work Product Doctrine, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1101, n. 128 (Winter 2012).
See e.g., Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 622 (7th Cir. 2009); Logan v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1996); Binks Mfg. Co. v. National
Presto Industries, Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1119 (7th Cir. 1983).
Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 622 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Work-product
protection applies to attorney-led investigations when the documents at issue ‘can fairly be said to
have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.’ Logan v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). There is
a distinction between precautionary documents ‘developed in the ordinary course of business’ for
the ‘remote prospect of future litigation’ and documents prepared because ‘some articulable
claim, likely to lead to litigation, [has] arisen.’ Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc., 709
F.2d 1109, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Only documents prepared in the latter circumstances receive work-product
protection.”).
Textron, at 29-30:
It is not enough to trigger work product protection that the subject matter of a document
relates to a subject that might conceivably be litigated. Rather, as the Supreme Court
explained, “the literal language of [Rule 26(b)(3)] protects materials prepared for any
litigation or trial as long as they were prepared by or for a party to the subsequent
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the ordinary course of business [ . . . ] or for [ . . . ] nonlitigation
purposes.”37 Lastly, the “primary motivating purpose” standard provides
work product protection where “the primary motivating purpose behind the
creation of the document was to aid in possible future litigation.”38
In Illinois, the work product doctrine covers only opinion work
product, which includes “an attorney’s ‘theories, mental impressions or
litigation plans’ and thus [does] not encompass[] much of the work
generated on a party’s behalf in preparation for trial.”39 Illinois work
product doctrine does not protect ordinary work product.40 Ordinary work
product is material that does not include “a party’s attorney’s theories,
impressions, or plans.”41 Although the Illinois protection applies to opinion
work product, the Illinois Supreme Court in Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Bucyrus-Erie Co., held that an attorney’s notes of discussions with various
witnesses that contained opinion work product may, nevertheless, be
discoverable where the party seeking disclosure showed “the absolute
impossibility” of obtaining such information elsewhere.42 Whereas, the
federal courts are split on whether work product protection applies to nonlawyers,43 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(b) extends the work product
protection to materials created by non-lawyers, as long as these materials
contain an attorney’s “theories, impressions, or plans.”44

37.
38.
39.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

litigation.” Federal Trade Commission v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 25, 103 S. Ct. 2209,
76 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1983) (emphasis added). This distinction is well established in the case
law. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138, 95 S. Ct. 1504, 44 L.
Ed. 2d 29 (1975). Nor is it enough that the materials were prepared by lawyers or
represent legal thinking. Much corporate material prepared in law offices or reviewed by
lawyers falls in that vast category. It is only work done in anticipation of or for trial that
is protected. Even if prepared by lawyers and reflecting legal thinking, “[m]aterials
assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public requirements
unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are not under the qualified
immunity provided by this subdivision.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note
(1970). Accord Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 510 n. 9 (quoting English precedent that
“[r]eports . . . if made in the ordinary course of routine, are not privileged”).
Id.
Id.
United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981); see also In re Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Co., 214 F.3d 586, 593 (5th Cir. 2000).
JEFFREY A. PARNESS, ILLINOIS CIVIL PROCEDURE, §14.06 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender) (citing
Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 361, 221 N.E.2d 410, 417 (1966)) “Yet, the zone of
privacy under Rule 201(b) is quite limited, covering only work product containing an attorney’s
“theories, mental impressions or litigation plans” and thus not encompassing much of the work
generated on a party’s behalf in preparation for trial; this privacy zone does not protect the names
of witnesses uncovered (even after significant efforts) or the statements made by such witnesses.”
Id.
Id.
Id. citing Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 109-10, 432 N.E.2d 250,
253 (1982).
FED R. CIV. PROC. 26, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (b)(3).
Jeffrey A. Parness, Illinois Civil Procedure, §14.06 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender).
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While the work product doctrine protects “the right of an attorney to
thoroughly prepare his [or her] case and to preclude a less diligent
adversary attorney from taking undue advantage of the former’s efforts,” 45
the attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure certain confidential
communications made between a client and his or her attorney.46 The
purpose of the privilege “is to encourage and promote full and frank
consultation between a client and legal advisor by removing the fear of
compelled disclosure of information.”47 Although courts recognize a
societal interest in protecting the confidentiality of communications
between an attorney and his or her client, countervailing policy interests of
truth-seeking during court proceedings have caused a narrow interpretation
of the privilege.48 Illinois’ “strong policy of encouraging disclosure”
therefore requires the courts to narrowly interpret the privilege.49
In keeping with the public policy of encouraging disclosure, Illinois
courts have placed the initial burden of showing that the privilege applies
on the party asserting the privilege or protection.50 The party asserting the
privilege must show that it expressly made the communication in a
confidential manner or that it reasonably believed that the communication
would remain confidential.51
As previously noted, IRE 502 is modeled on FRE 502. Therefore,
FRE 502, and its commentary, serve as a helpful guide in the interpretation
of IRE 502. While FRE 502 establishes “some exceptions to waiver,” it
“does not purport to supplant applicable waiver doctrine generally.”52
Accordingly, FRE 502 was “not intended to displace or modify federal
common law concerning waiver of privilege or work product where no
disclosure has been made.”53 In Illinois, pursuant to IRE 501, privileges are
“governed by the principles of the common law,” absent a contrary statute,
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

53.

Fischel & Kahn Ltd. v. van Straaten Gallery Inc., 189 Ill. 2d 579, 591 (2000), citing Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
People v. Adam, 51 Ill. 2d 46, 48, 280 N.E.2d 205, 207 (1972).
Center Partners, 2012 IL 113107, ¶ 31.
Id. at ¶ 32.
Id. at ¶ 31.
Janousek v. Slotky, 2012 IL App (1st) 113432, ¶ 23.
Id. at ¶ 24; see also Garvy v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 2012 IL App (1st) 110115.
FED. R. EVID. 502, Advisory Committee Notes §2, (“Moreover, while establishing some
exceptions to waiver, the rule does not purport to supplant applicable waiver doctrine generally.
The rule governs only certain waivers by disclosure. Other common-law waiver doctrines may
result in a finding of waiver even where there is no disclosure of privileged information or work
product. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 1999) (reliance on an advice of
counsel defense waives the privilege with respect to attorney-client communications pertinent to
that defense); Ryers [Byers] v. Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436 (D.D.C. 1983) (allegation of lawyer
malpractice constituted a waiver of confidential communications under the circumstances). The
rule is not intended to displace or modify federal common law concerning waiver of privilege or
work product where no disclosure has been made.”).
FED. R. EVID. 502, Advisory Committee Notes §2.
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Supreme Court rule, or constitutional provision. The Illinois attorney-client
privilege is the creation of the common law. Therefore, the Illinois
common law attorney-client privilege waiver rule will continue to apply
and will not be displaced in situations where no disclosure of privileged
information or work product occurred.54 Such situations may include legal
malpractice actions or allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel raised
by a criminal defendant.55
Prior to the enactment of IRE 502, there was no clear precedent for
waiver of work product protection in Illinois, and Supreme Court Rule
201(b) did not address the issue.56 IRE 502 now sets out a broader
definition of work product than established under Illinois common law.
IRE 502 adopted the broader definition of work product found in FRE 502,
and the Illinois rule, much like FRE 502, now covers opinion as well as fact
work product. Illinois has until now only offered work product protection
to opinion work product, and not to fact work product. The broader
definition was adapted from FRE 502(g). However, Illinois has not
adopted FRCP 26(b)(3).
The Illinois Supreme Court, through the adoption of IRE 502, has
greatly simplified the waiver analysis. First, following a disclosure, the
court must determine whether the disclosure was intentional or inadvertent.
If the disclosure was intentional, the court will consider whether fairness
requires the imposition of subject matter waiver. If the disclosure was
inadvertent, the court should rely on the guidelines provided in IRE 502(b)
to determine whether the holder of the privilege or protection took
reasonable steps to prevent the disclosure and promptly took reasonable
steps to rectify the error in accordance with Rule 201(p), if applicable.

54.

55.

56.

Id:
The rule governs only certain waivers by disclosure. Other common-law waiver
doctrines may result in a finding of waiver even where there is no disclosure of privileged
information or work product. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200 (5th Cir.
1999) (reliance on an advice of counsel defense waives the privilege with respect to
attorney-client communications pertinent to that defense); [Byers] v. Burleson, 100
F.R.D. 436 (D.D.C. 1983) (allegation of lawyer malpractice constituted a waiver of
confidential communications under the circumstances). The rule is not intended to
displace or modify federal common law concerning waiver of privilege or work product
where no disclosure has been made.
Id.
See, e.g., Fischel & Kahn Ltd. v. van Straaten Gallery Inc., 189 Ill. 2d 579, 591 (2000) (client
suing a former attorney does not waive the privilege as to communications with a subsequent
attorney; see also, People v. O’Banner, 215 Ill. App. 3d 778 (1st Dist. 1991) (substance of
attorney-client communications at issue not protected by attorney-client privilege where criminal
defendant raised claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
PARNESS, supra note 44. (“While significant Illinois precedents are lacking and Rule 201(b) is
silent, opinion work product protection may also be waiveable.”).
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A. IRE 502(a): Intentional Disclosure and Subject Matter Waiver
Sub-section (a) of IRE 502 addresses subject matter waiver of work
product protection and the attorney-client privilege. IRE 502(a) has
substantially narrowed the scope of subject matter waiver following an
intentional disclosure. Prior to the adoption of IRE 502(a), the Illinois
common law subject matter rule recognized that a client’s disclosure of
portions of her conversation with her attorney amounted “to a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege as to the remainder of the conversation or
communication about the same subject matter.”57 The Illinois common law
mirrored the federal common law rule on subject matter waiver, finding that
voluntary disclosure by a party of a part of a privileged communication
waived the privilege for all communications “on the same subject matter.”58
The enactment of FRE 502 “narrow[ed] the scope of waiver of the
attorney-client privilege in federal proceedings to communications actually
revealed. It create[d] an exception allowing subject matter waiver only
under unusual circumstances.”59 FRE 502(a) does not determine whether
disclosure of materials waives the privilege or protection. Rather, if there
has been a waiver, FRE 502 informs whether protection for other material
not provided is also waived.60
Now in Illinois, under IRE 502(a), which was modeled on FRE
502(a), subject matter waiver occurs “only if [it is] intentional, the
disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same
subject matter, and they ought in fairness be considered together.” It is
clear from IRE 502(a)(1) that subject matter waiver cannot occur in cases of
inadvertent or accidental disclosure.61
Moreover, subject matter waiver is not a default rule following an
intentional disclosure. Rather, it acts as an exception which is enforced

57.

58.
59.

60.
61.

In re Grand Jury, Jan. 246, 272 Ill. App. 3d 991, 997 (1st Dist. 1995); see also People v.
O'Banner, 215 Ill. App. 3d 778, 793 (1st Dist. 1991); People v. O’Connor, 37 Ill. App. 3d 310,
314 (3rd Dist. 1976); Newton v. Meissner, 76 Ill. App. 3d 479, 499 (1st Dist. 1979) (noting that
voluntary disclosure of confidential information does not effectively waive the privilege as to all
conversations or the whole breadth of the discussion which may have taken place).
Charles Alan Wright et al., §5444 Limiting Scope of Waiver, 23 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. §5444
(Updated April 2012).
Id. (emphasis added); see also 7 ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST §42:68 (noting that voluntary
disclosure “to a third party, or opposing party, [of] substantial portions of documents or
communications protected by the attorney-client privilege generally waived the privilege to the
whole subject matter addressed in the disclosed communication.”); Vardon Golf Co., Inc. v.
Karsten Mfg. Corp., 213 F.R.D. 528, 533 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Blanchard v. EdgeMark Fin. Corp.,
192 F.R.D. 233, 236 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
FED. R. EVID. 502, Advisory Committee Notes Subdivision (a); In re Aftermarket Filters Antitrust
Litig., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122111, 18-19 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2010).
See also FED. R. EVID. 502, Advisory Committee Note Subdivision (a).
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only in those “unusual situations”62 where the producing party is attempting
to gain an unfair advantage by selectively disclosing only favorable
information, while refusing to produce the unfavorable materials.63 In all
other instances, where a party makes an intentional disclosure, a waiver
occurs only as to the information or communication actually disclosed.64
Before the enactment of the Illinois Rules of Evidence, Illinois courts
addressed the nature of subject matter waiver of the attorney-client
privilege only in the context of disclosure in judicial proceedings or
depositions.65 The Illinois common law rule was silent on whether subject
matter waiver would apply to extrajudicial disclosure.66 Recently, the
Illinois Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, addressed the nature of
the attorney-client privilege waiver in extrajudicial setting in Center
Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC.67 The Supreme Court clarified
that extrajudicial disclosure may include, but is not limited to business
negotiations.68 The Supreme Court held that subject matter waiver does not
apply to extrajudicial disclosure of attorney-client communications when
they are not subsequently used by the holder “to gain an adversarial
advantage in litigation.”69 Therefore, fairness considerations require the
application of subject matter waiver when a holder of the attorney-client
privilege or work product protection strategically discloses only select
portions of privileged and protected material during business negotiations
62.

63.
64.
65.

66.

67.
68.
69.

Charles Alan Wright et al., §5444 LIMITING SCOPE OF WAIVER, 23 FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. §
5444 (Updated April 2012); see also 7 Annotated Patent Digest § 42:68 (noting that voluntary
disclosure “to a third party, or opposing party, [of] substantial portions of documents or
communications protected by the attorney-client privilege generally waived the privilege to the
whole subject matter addressed in the disclosed communication.”); see also Vardon Golf Co, at
533; Blanchard, at 236.
See Center Partners, 2012 IL 113107, ¶26.
See FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee Note Subdivision (a).
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, Jan. 246, 272 Ill. App. 3d 991, 997, 651 N.E.2d 696, 700 (1995)
(disclosure in a deposition); People v. O'Banner, 215 Ill. App. 3d 778, 793, 575 N.E.2d 1261,
1270 (1991) (testimony at trial); and see People v. O'Connor, 37 Ill. App. 3d 310, 314, 345
N.E.2d 520, 524 (1976) (testimony at trial).
Center Partners, at ¶ 43; citing People v. Gerold, 265 Ill. 448, 481, 107 N.E. 165, 178 (1914),
Newton v. Meissner, 76 Ill. App. 3d 479, 394 N.E.2d 1241 (1979), In re Grand Jury, 272 Ill. App.
3d at 997, 651 N.E.2d at 700 (“[a]lthough voluntary disclosure of confidential information does
not effectively waive an attorney-client privilege as to all other non-disclosed communications
that may have taken place (citation omitted), where a client reveals portions of her conversation
with her attorney, those revelations amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to the
remainder of the conversation or communication about the same subject matter.”); see also
O'Banner, , 215 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 575 N.E.2d at 1270; and see O'Connor, 37 Ill. App. 3d 310 at
314, 345 N.E.2d at 524; see also Newton, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 499, 394 N.E.2d at 1255 (noting that
“voluntary disclosure of confidential information does not effectively waive the privilege as to all
conversations or the whole breadth of the discussion which may have taken place.”
Center Partners, at ¶ 26. Note that ILL. R. EVID. 502, effective January 1, 2013, was not yet in
effect when the Supreme Court issued its opinion on November 29, 2012.
Id. at ¶ 60.
Id. at ¶ 49 (emphasis added).
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in a misleading manner in order “to gain a later tactical advantage in
anticipated litigation.”70
The fairness factor of IRE 502(a)(3) is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s considerations of fairness in Center Partners.71 IRE 502(a)(3)
states that a subject matter waiver extends to undisclosed communication if
the disclosed and undisclosed communications “ought in fairness to be
considered together.” The “fairness” language in FRE 502(a), which IRE
502(a) mirrors, was adopted from FRE 106,72 which IRE 106 replicates.73
IRE 106 provides that whenever a party introduces a part of a writing, the
opposing party may require disclosure “of any other part or any other
writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness be considered
contemporaneously with it.” IRE 106 was an attempt to modernize Illinois
evidentiary rules.74 Under IRE 502(a), fairness considerations would
require subject matter waiver only in those “unusual situations”75 where a
party uses the privilege as both a “shield” and a “sword.”76 A party uses the
privilege as a “sword” by intentionally disclosing only favorable
information to the opponent, while at the same time invoking the privilege
as a “shield” to hide unfavorable materials.77 For this reason, IRE 502(a)
will help prevent parties in Illinois from using the attorney-client privilege
and work product protection to gain an unfair advantage in litigation.
In addition, the fact that IRE 502(a) was modeled on FRE 502(a)
should ensure uniformity in the interpretation of subject matter waiver in
Illinois state proceedings and in federal actions. The commentary to FRE
502(a) indicates that “the federal rule on subject matter waiver governs
subsequent state court determinations on the scope of the waiver by that
disclosure.”78 Since IRE 502(a) contains the same requirements as FRE
502(a), subject matter waiver in Illinois should be more consistent with
federal waiver proceedings.

70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

78.

Id. at ¶ 48.
Id. at ¶ 59, citing In re EchoStar Communications Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2006), In
re Keeper of the Records (Grand Jury Subpoena Addressed to XYZ Corp.), 348 F.3d 16, 24 (1st
Cir. 2003); Graco Children's Products, Inc. v. Dressler, Goldsmith, Shore & Milnamow, Ltd., No.
95 C 1303, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8157, 1995 WL 360590, (N.D. Ill. June 14, 1995).
FED. R. EVID. 502, Advisory Committee Notes to Subdivision (a).
ILL. R. EVID. 106 (“When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party,
an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.”).
ILL. R. EVID. Committee Commentary (2).
Cf. FED. R. EVID. 502(a), Committee Note.
Center Partners, at ¶ 39.
Id. at ¶ 59, citing In re EchoStar Communications Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2006), In
re Keeper of the Records (Grand Jury Subpoena Addressed to XYZ Corp.), 348 F.3d 16, 24 (1st
Cir. 2003); Graco Children's Products, Inc. v. Dressler, Goldsmith, Shore & Milnamow, Ltd., No.
95 C 1303, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8157, 1995 WL 360590, (N.D. Ill. June 14, 1995).
FED. R. EVID. 502, Advisory Committee Notes to Subdivision (a).
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B. IRE 502(b): Inadvertent Disclosure
Prior to the adoption of IRE 502 and Rule 201(p), Illinois lacked
uniformity in cases of inadvertent disclosure. Previously, Illinois courts
applied three standards: (1) a subjective standard; (2) an objective standard;
and (3) a balancing test.79
Under the subjective standard, a “true waiver” from inadvertent
disclosure could never occur, because the holder had “no intention to waive
the privilege.”80 However, the objective standard almost always resulted in
finding of a waiver, because the mere act of disclosure resulted in a
waiver.81 Thus, once a court found that confidential information had been
revealed, confidentiality was lost, as well as the attorney-client privilege.82
Finally, the balancing standard required the courts to evaluate various
factors, including the “reasonableness of the precautions” taken by the
disclosing party, whether timely attempts had been made to rectify the
disclosure, the scope of discovery, the extent of the disclosure, and the
interests of fairness.83
If a court adopts the subjective or the objective analysis, either test the
court chooses would largely be determinative of the outcome. Application
of the subjective analysis would result in a finding of no waiver,84 whereas
the application of the objective analysis would result in a finding of waiver
simply if a disclosure had been made. The outcome in cases where the
courts followed the balancing test, however, was more unpredictable,
because courts had more flexibility in their ultimate determination by taking
various factors into consideration along with the “interests of fairness.”
The Illinois courts’ determination of the scope of waiver “based on the
standards of fairness” was “[c]onsistent with federal law” as it existed prior
to the adoption of FRE 502(b).85 Prior to the enactment of FRE 502(b),
similarly varying standards existed for determining the consequences of
inadvertent disclosure in federal courts.86 Some courts followed the view
79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Dalen v. Ozite Corp., 230 Ill. App. 3d 18, 28, 594 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (1992), citing Golden
Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204 (N. Dist. IN 1990).
People v. Murry, 305 Ill. App. 3d 311, 315, 711 N.E.2d 1230, 1234 (1999); see also, Dalen, 230
Ill. App. 3d at 28, 594 N.E.2d at 1371 (“Under a subjective analysis, inadvertent disclosure can
never result in a true waiver because ‘there was no intention to waive the privilege, and one
cannot waive the privilege without intending to do so.”).
See Dalen, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 28, 594 N.E.2d at 1371.
Id.
Id.; see also Sherman v. Ryan, 392 Ill. App. 3d 712, 736, 911 N.E.2d 378, 400 (2009) (refusing to
apply the balancing test where no actual disclosure occurred, therefore, defendants’ disclosure of
work product to auditors did not constitute waiver of work product protection).
People v. Murry, 305 Ill. App. 3d 311, 316, 911 N.E.2d 1230, 1235 (1999).
Paul R. Rice & Peter Bonanno, 1 Attorney-Client Privilege: State Law Illinois § 9:80 (Updated
April 2010).
FED. R. EVID. 502, Advisory Committee Notes to Subdivision (b).
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that a disclosure had to be intentional to constitute a waiver, while others
found a waiver “only if the disclosing party acted carelessly.”87 Through
FRE 502(b), federal courts apply the majority approach, which was
identical to the balancing approach adopted by some Illinois courts.88 From
this, one can conclude that IRE 502(b) has also adopted the balancing test.
However, much like FRE 502(b), IRE 502(b) did not codify specific
factors, since such factors are merely “non-determinative guidelines that
vary from case to case.”89
Although “inadvertent disclosure” is not defined in IRE 502, the
absence of a definition does not mean that the phrase should in any way be
considered ambiguous or confusing. Since IRE 502 was modeled on FRE
502, the interpretation of “inadvertent disclosure” in the context of FRE
502(b) is instructive. Accordingly, “inadvertent disclosure” should be
given its most straightforward meaning. “Inadvertent disclosure” means the
opposite of “intentional disclosure,” and is simply “mistaken” or
“unintentional” production.90
Pursuant to IRE 502(b), an inadvertent disclosure will not result in a
waiver of the privilege where the holder of the privilege took “reasonable
steps to prevent disclosure,” and “promptly took reasonable steps to rectify
the error.” Following inadvertent disclosure during discovery in civil cases,
the disclosing party should look to Rule 201(p) to ensure protection of the
privilege over the material. First, the disclosing party “may notify any party
that received the information of the claim and the basis for it.”91 FRE
502(b), on which IRE 502(b) is modeled, “does not require the producing
party to engage in a post-production review to determine whether any
protected communication or information has been produced by mistake.” 92
However, FRE 502(b) “does require the producing party to follow up on
any obvious indications that a protected communication or information has
been produced inadvertently.”93 From this we conclude that under IRE
502(b), the producing party also need not engage in such post-production
review, but it must take affirmative action if there are “any obvious
indications”94 that it inadvertently disclosed protected information to the
other party.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. See, e.g., Dalen v. Ozite Corp., 230 Ill. App. 3d 18, 28, 594 N.E.2d 1365, 1371(1992).
FED. R. EVID. 502, Advisory Committee Notes to Subdivision (b); see also Sidney I. v. Focused
Retail Prop. I, LLC, 274 F.R.D. 212, 215 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
Paul W. Grimm, Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & Matthew P. Kraeuter, Federal Rule of Evidence 502:
Has It Lived Up to Its Potential?, XVII RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, at 33 (2011),
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v17i3/article8.pdf.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(p) (emphasis added).
FED. R. EVID. 502, Advisory Committee Notes to Subdivision (b).
Id.
Id.
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The producing party has the burden to show that disclosure was
inadvertent and that it took reasonable steps to prevent the disclosure.95 If
the producing party cannot show that it took such reasonable steps, it will
not be allowed to “reclaw” the disclosed documents pursuant to Rule
201(p).96
Although Rule 201(p), much like FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) on which it was
modeled, uses permissive language and states that the producing party may
notify the receiving party about the inadvertent disclosure, the commentary
to the federal rule appears to mandate the giving of notice. The
commentary to FRCP 26(b)(5)(B),97 admonishes that the producing party
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Cf. Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116647.
FED. R. CIV. PROC. R. 26, Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(5):
Rule 26(b)(5)(B) does not address whether the privilege or protection that is asserted
after production was waived by the production. The courts have developed principles to
determine whether, and under what circumstances, waiver results from inadvertent
production of privileged or protected information. Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides a procedure
for presenting and addressing these issues. Rule 26(b)(5)(B) works in tandem with Rule
26(f), which is amended to direct the parties to discuss privilege issues in preparing their
discovery plan, and which, with amended Rule 16(b), allows the parties to ask the court
to include in an order any agreements the parties reach regarding issues of privilege or
trial-preparation material protection. Agreements reached under Rule 26(f)(4) and orders
including such agreements entered under Rule 16(b)(6) may be considered when a court
determines whether a waiver has occurred. Such agreements and orders ordinarily
control if they adopt procedures different from those in Rule 26(b)(5)(B).
A party asserting a claim of privilege or protection after production must give notice to
the receiving party. That notice should be in writing unless the circumstances preclude it.
Such circumstances could include the assertion of the claim during a deposition. The
notice should be as specific as possible in identifying the information and stating the
basis for the claim. Because the receiving party must decide whether to challenge the
claim and may sequester the information and submit it to the court for a ruling on
whether the claimed privilege or protection applies and whether it has been waived, the
notice should be sufficiently detailed so as to enable the receiving party and the court to
understand the basis for the claim and to determine whether waiver has occurred. Courts
will continue to examine whether a claim of privilege or protection was made at a
reasonable time when delay is part of the waiver determination under the governing law.
After receiving notice, each party that received the information must promptly return,
sequester, or destroy the information and any copies it has. The option of sequestering or
destroying the information is included in part because the receiving party may have
incorporated the information in protected trial-preparation materials. No receiving party
may use or disclose the information pending resolution of the privilege claim. The
receiving party may present to the court the questions whether the information is
privileged or protected as trial-preparation material, and whether the privilege or
protection has been waived. If it does so, it must provide the court with the grounds for
the privilege or protection specified in the producing party's notice, and serve all parties.
In presenting the question, the party may use the content of the information only to the
extent permitted by the applicable law of privilege, protection for trial-preparation
material, and professional responsibility.
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“asserting a claim of privilege or protection after production must give
notice to the receiving party.”98 Ideally, the notice should be in writing, but
even if it is not written, it must specifically set out the basis for the claim so
as to enable the receiving party to identify the allegedly protected
information.99
Once notified about the inadvertent disclosure, the recipient has a
mandatory duty to take various steps to comply with Rule 201(p). The
recipient “must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified
information and any copies; must not use or disclose the information until
the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information
if the receiving party disclosed the information to third parties before being
notified; and may promptly present the information to the court under seal
for a determination of the claim.”100 Throughout the process, the producing
party has an obligation to “preserve the information until the claim is
resolved.”101 The new rules intend to provide greater protection to parties
participating in a voluminous discovery process, especially “[w]hen the
review is of electronically stored information.”102
FRCP 26 (b) (5) was not intended to create a federal rule of privilege
waiver or to modify substantive law.103 FRCP 26 (b) (5) merely sought to
If a party disclosed the information to nonparties before receiving notice of a claim of
privilege or protection as trial-preparation material, it must take reasonable steps to
retrieve the information and to return it, sequester it until the claim is resolved, or destroy
it.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

103.

Whether the information is returned or not, the producing party must preserve the
information pending the court's ruling on whether the claim of privilege or of protection
is properly asserted and whether it was waived. As with claims made under Rule
26(b)(5)(A), there may be no ruling if the other parties do not contest the claim.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(p) (emphasis added).
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(p).
FED. R. CIV. PROC. R. 26, Note to Subdivision (b)(5):
The Committee has repeatedly been advised that the risk of privilege waiver, and the
work necessary to avoid it, add to the costs and delay of discovery. When the review is
of electronically stored information, the risk of waiver, and the time and effort required to
avoid it, can increase substantially because of the volume of electronically stored
information and the difficulty in ensuring that all information to be produced has in fact
been reviewed. Rule 26(b)(5)(A) provides a procedure for a party that has withheld
information on the basis of privilege or protection as trial-preparation material to make
the claim so that the requesting party can decide whether to contest the claim and the
court can resolve the dispute. Rule 26(b)(5)(B) is added to provide a procedure for a
party to assert a claim of privilege or trial-preparation material protection after
information is produced in discovery in the action and, if the claim is contested, permit
any party that received the information to present the matter to the court for resolution.
Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 201 (Spring 2006) (“If
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee wanted to avoid creating a federal rule of preservation,
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“adopt the essentials of a ‘claw back’ agreement as the default procedure in
the event there was no formal agreement.”104 There is no indication that
Rule 201(p) was intended to modify Illinois substantive law. Rule 201(p) is
a procedural rule that sets out the steps required to preserve confidentiality
of inadvertently disclosed materials where no agreement with respect to
such disclosure existed.
C. IRE 502(c): Disclosure to Federal Office or Agency
Sub-section (c) of IRE 502 addresses the effect of disclosure of
privileged material to a federal office or agency.105 The adoption of IRE
502(c) has aligned Illinois law with current federal law, and has the
potential to eliminate any conflicts in the interplay between Illinois and
federal attorney-client waiver and work product protection provisions.
Absent a court order concerning waiver, the disclosure of material to a
federal office or agency does not constitute waiver in an Illinois proceeding
if the disclosure would not be a waiver had it been made in an Illinois
proceeding. Alternatively, such disclosure will not constitute a waiver in
Illinois if it is not a waiver under the law governing the federal proceeding
where the disclosure had occurred. The Illinois rule imposes the same
guidelines on the treatment of a disclosure to another state’s office or
agency. Where disclosure occurs in another state and is subject to a
protective order, Illinois is required to provide full faith and credit to the
other state’s order.106
If a party in an Illinois proceeding inadvertently discloses confidential
communications (where no state-court protective order exists), and this
disclosed information is subsequently sought in a federal proceeding, FRE
502(c) would apply, and a federal court would apply “the law that is most

expressly or implicitly, in Rule 26(b)(2), the Committee wanted even more to avoid creating a
federal rule of privilege waiver, expressly or implicitly, in Rule 26(b)(5). Not only could that
invade the territory of the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee, but it could also be viewed as
establishing or modifying substantive law under the guise of adopting a procedural rule.
However, something had to be done to rein in the cost of screening electronically stored
information (and conventional documentation for that matter) for privilege before production.”).
104. Id.
105. ILL. R. EVID. 503(c).
106. See, e.g.,Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-650
(2012); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-651 (2012) (“‘foreign judgment’ means any judgment, decree,
or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and
credit in this State.”) (emphasis in original); see also Sackett Enterprises, Inc. v. Staren, 211 Ill.
App. 3d 997, 1000, 570 N.E.2d 702, 704 (1991) (“The [United States] Constitution requires that
‘Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial
Proceedings of every other State.’” (U.S. Const., art. IV, §1”)).
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protective against waiver.”107 Because IRE 502(c) adopted the language of
FRE 502(c), it would similarly uphold the law that is most protective
against waiver. Since the waiver rules in Illinois and federal proceedings
are now consistent with each other, there should be no conflict with federal
law in Illinois following a disclosure that occurred to a federal office or
agency. There should be no conflict even though FRE 502(f) “applies
[FRE 502] to state proceedings . . . even if state law provides the rule of
decision.”108 It follows that if a disclosure occurs to a federal office or
agency, Illinois courts in subsequent state proceedings are required to
“honor [Federal] Rule 502.”109 Following the adoption of IRE 502(c),
Illinois courts should “honor” the federal rule despite the fact that the
language of the IRE 502(c) appears to allow Illinois courts to apply Illinois
law as an alternative to simply deferring to the law governing federal
proceedings where the disclosure occurred. Since the Illinois rule of waiver
is now consistent with the federal rule, conflicts should arise rarely because
courts in Illinois will apply the same rules as federal courts.
D. IRE 502(d): Controlling Effect of a Court Order
The new rule further raises the issue of enforceability of Illinois
protective orders in subsequent federal proceedings. Sub-section (d) of IRE
502 states that, “An Illinois court may order that the privilege or protection
is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the
court—in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other
proceeding.” Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(c)(1) states that a “court
may at any time on its own initiative, or on motion of any party or witness,
make a protective order as justice requires, denying, limiting, conditioning,
or regulating discovery to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense,
embarrassment, disadvantage, or oppression.” Although IRE 502(d) is
generally in keeping with the requirements of Rule 201(c)(1), it goes
beyond the scope of Rule 201 by compelling the enforcement of such
protective orders in other proceedings. The extension of the rule may not
be necessary, however, because federal courts will already enforce Illinois
protective orders,110 and other states are required to provide full faith and
credit to Illinois orders.111 Adoption of IRE 502(d) enhances the
107. FED. R. EVID. 502, The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Letter from the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States to the Committee on the
Judiciary of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives (September 26, 2007).
108. FED. R. EVID. 502(f).
109. Id.
110. FED. R. EVID. 502, Advisory Committee Notes to Subdivision (c).
111. See, e.g., Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-650 et
seq.); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-651 (“‘foreign judgment’ means any judgment, decree, or order
of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this
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enforceability of Illinois protective court orders, where Illinois courts have
found no waiver, in subsequent federal or other states’ proceedings.
E. IRE 502(e): Controlling Effect of Party Agreement
Sub-section (e) of IRE 502 allows parties to enter into agreements “to
limit the effect of waiver that occurs between or among them.”112 IRE
502(e) states, “An agreement on the effect of disclosure in an Illinois
proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is
incorporated into a court order.”113 It follows that such an agreement is not
enforceable against those who are not party to the agreement or in unrelated
litigation. To ensure enforceability of such agreement against third parties
or in other litigation, the agreement should be made part of a court order.114
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS
Finally, it is important for us to comment that IRE 502 does not
infringe on separation of powers principles with respect to waiver in Illinois
administrative proceedings.115 During committee hearings, Professor
Jeffrey A. Parness argued that IRE 502 would unconstitutionally prescribe
evidentiary rules for administrative proceedings.116 We do not agree. IRE
101 limits the applicability of the Illinois Rules of Evidence to
“proceedings in the courts of Illinois.”117 In Illinois, the Illinois Supreme
Court has the authority to enact rules of evidence that govern civil and
criminal judicial proceedings. On the other hand, it is the legislature that
has the authority to enact rules of procedure and evidence for administrative
hearings.118 Since the legislature has chosen to apply evidence rules that
govern civil judicial proceedings to administrative proceedings,119 that
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115.
116.
117.
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119.

State.” [emphasis added]); see also Sackett Enterprises, Inc. v. Staren, 211 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1000,
570 N.E.2d 702, 704 (1991) (“The [United States] Constitution requires that ‘Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every
other State.’ (U.S. Const., art. IV, §1”)).
FED. R. EVID. 502, Advisory Committee Notes to Subdivision (e).
ILL. R. EVID. 502(e).
FED. R. EVID. 502, Advisory Committee Notes to Subdivision (e).
Id.; see also ILL. R. EVID. 101.
Jeffrey A. Parness, The Ins and Outs of the New Illinois Evidence Rules, 35 S. ILL. U. L.J. 4, 7-8
(Summer 2011).
Illinois Rule of Evidence 101 specifies that Illinois Rules of Evidence govern judicial proceedings
“to the extent and with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101.” Rule 1101 makes Illinois Rules of
Evidence inapplicable (“other than with respect to privileges”) in a preliminary determination of a
question of fact, in a grand jury proceeding, small claims actions and in various other proceedings
(such as sentencing, contempt, extradition or rendition proceedings, among others).
Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/1-1 (2013).
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/10-40 (2013), Rules of evidence; official notice. In contested cases:
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includes the application of IRE 502. IRE 502 does not violate separation of
powers principles because the two branches have acted harmoniously
within their respective spheres.
IV. CONCLUSION
IRE 502 and Rule 201(p) have the potential to greatly simplify and
clarify Illinois law pertaining to the waiver of the attorney-client privilege
and work product protection. IRE 502(f), however, may have created a
conflict in Illinois by adopting the federal definition of work product
protection. This conflict should be addressed by the Illinois Supreme Court
to provide litigating parties some additional clarity in this area. Other than
this conflict, the rules provide clear guidelines for Illinois courts and should
be especially helpful to litigants who engage in large-volume discovery,
including the inadvertent disclosure of electronically stored information.120

Irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. The rules of
evidence and privilege as applied in civil cases in the circuit courts of this State shall be
followed. Evidence not admissible under those rules of evidence may be admitted,
however, (except where precluded by statute) if it is of a type commonly relied upon by
reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. Objections to evidentiary offers
may be made and shall be noted in the record. Subject to these requirements, when a
hearing will be expedited and the interests of the parties will not be prejudiced, any part
of the evidence may be received in written form.
Id. (emphasis added).
120. Jack B. Weinstein, et al., Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 502, Attorney-Client Privilege and
Work Product; Limitations on Waiver (2013).

